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Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between business strategy and cost stickiness
under different ownership. Using the data from listed firms in China from 2002 to 2015, we find that
first, firms with different strategies exhibit different cost behavior. The cost stickiness of choosing a
differentiation strategy is higher than that of choosing a low-cost strategy. Second, management
expectations will affect cost stickiness. Optimistic expectations will increase cost stickiness, while
pessimistic expectations will reduce cost stickiness. Third, management expectations can adjust the
relationship between business strategy and cost stickiness in terms of government-created
advantages (GCAs). If management expectations tend to be optimistic, the cost stickiness is higher
with a differentiation strategy than with a low-cost strategy. If management expectations tend to be
pessimistic, then cost stickiness is higher with a low-cost strategy than with a differentiation
strategy. Finally, the state-owned equity affects the extent of the effect of a differentiation strategy
on cost stickiness. State-owned firms, which receive more GCAs than non-state-owned firms, have
stronger cost stickiness than non-state-owned firms, even if both categories of firms use more
differentiation strategy.
Keywords: business strategy; cost stickiness; state-owned firms; institutional advantages

1. Introduction
This study uses Porter's [1] business strategy typology to examine whether companies that
follow different business strategies exhibit differences in asymmetric cost behavior and whether
firms’ business strategies are a factor in determining cost stickiness. By exploring the extent to which
firms following particular business strategies are more likely to exhibit different cost stickiness, we
provide evidence that increases our understanding of the underlying determinants of cost stickiness.
Traditional cost models assume that costs change symmetrically and proportionally with
increases or decreases in activity [2]. However, recent empirical research demonstrates asymmetry in
cost behavior — in other words, that costs increase more rapidly with activities than they decrease
— which has been termed “cost stickiness” [3]. Recent studies have examined asymmetric cost
behavior as a function of managerial deliberate cost adjustment [3–5], managerial optimism or
pessimism [6], earnings management incentives [7,8], agency problem [9], earnings forecasts [10],
capacity utilization [11], unemployment [12], product market competition [13], corporate social
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responsibility [14], conservatism [15], and whether or not the costs are related to the core operations
of a firm [16].
However, most of these studies ignore the effect of business strategy on cost stickiness, especially
due to management expectations and different state-owned equity—which particularly affects
emerging economy firms that have been strongly influenced by their government-created advantages
(GCAs). Porter’s [1] business strategy typology is commonly used by companies and recognized as
the dominant paradigm used in the literature related to competitive strategies, namely business cost
leadership and differentiation strategies [17–21]. We address this gap in the literature by examining
these associations in the context of an underlying determinant of firms’ cost stickiness—their business
strategies. Using strategy theory, we focus on the association between firms’ business strategies and
their cost stickiness. We begin by investigating the extent to which cost stickiness differs across
business strategies. We then examine whether business strategy ultimately helps explain the
observed variation in cost stickiness under different equity nature. This study is crucial since
organizational theory (OT) delivers a framework for understanding how companies’ business
strategies can contribute to their competition by cost management.
In this paper, following strategy theory, we argue that managers will deliberately match a firm’s
cost structure to the firm’s business strategy by intuitively adjusting how resources are committed
depending on their expectation on the sales; in this case, the selection of business strategy will affect
the firm’s asymmetric cost behavior. Anderson et al. [3] and Banker and Chen [22] argue that costs
will be adjusted when the manager selects a business strategy because managers will have to increase
or decrease the necessary or slack resources. Balakrishnan and Gruca [16] find that cost stickiness is
only reliable in costs associated with an organization’s core services. Moreover, the cost stickiness of
core services reliably exceeds that of ancillary and support services, which means that when an
organization implements a differentiation strategy, the function representing the organization’s core
competency influences the stickiness of associated costs. Managers tend to be hesitant to cut costs in
their core activity associated with direct patient care both due to the acute nature of those services to
the organization’s mission and due to the (greater) adjustment costs related to switching this capacity.
As a contrast, it is substantially easier and less costly to adjust capacity degrees in outlying support
services.
Porter’s [1,23] generic business-level strategies, i.e., “overall cost leadership, differentiation, and
focus”, have turned into a major paradigm in the corporate business policy literature. Each of these
represents "a fundamentally different approach to creating and sustaining a competitive advantage”
since “usually a firm must make a choice between them or it will become stuck in the middle” [23].
Additionally, Porter stressed that "achieving cost leadership and differentiation are usually
inconsistent because differentiation is usually costly" [23]. The two main business strategies— cost
leadership and differentiation—require firms to establish matched cost structures. Achieving a
successful differentiation strategy position requires that a firm pursue technology leadership or
create a high degree of brand loyalty; differentiators must invest considerable resources in
establishing this specialized ability. Consequently, when the market is in a slump, differentiators are
reluctant to reduce these slack resources, which are useless for other firms but highly expensive to
construct. On the contrary, cost leadership is used primarily to gain an advantage over competitors
by reducing operation costs below those of others in the same industry, resulting in a lean cost
structure and low adjustment costs. Consequently, the choice of business strategy may affect the cost
structure as well as the cost stickiness.
In addition, governments tend to interfere in state-owned firms’ decision-making procedures
and demand corporate activities, which can be desirable from the socio-political view. For instance,
in order to secure political support, politicians can request state-owned firms to avoid layoffs to
mitigate unemployment rates. The varied purposes of state-owned firms, too, make it more difficult
to monitor managerial behaviors, leading to larger managerial discretion and to the self-interest
pursuit via empire-building behaviors. Not only state intervention but also managers’ self-interests
hinder them from laying employees off or cutting off investment when sales decrease, which may
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lead to greater cost stickiness. However, it is not clear how the interaction of business strategy and
state ownership affects the cost stickiness.
Using the longitudinal panel data from listed companies in China from 2002 to 2015, our results
support our predictions and show a significant relationship between business strategy and cost
stickiness. First, different business strategies lead to different cost behaviors. The cost stickiness of
choosing a differentiation strategy is higher than that of choosing a low-cost strategy. Second,
different management expectations affect cost stickiness. Optimistic expectations will increase cost
stickiness while pessimistic expectations reduce cost stickiness. Third, management expectations can
adjust the relationship between corporate strategy and cost stickiness. If management expectations
tend to be optimistic, the cost stickiness is higher with a differentiation strategy than with a low-cost
strategy. If management expectations tend to be pessimistic, then cost stickiness is higher with a lowcost strategy than with a differentiation strategy. Finally, state-owned equity affects the extent of the
effect of a differentiation strategy on cost stickiness. State-owned firms, which receive more GCAs
than non-state-owned firms, have stronger cost stickiness than non-state-owned firms, even if both
categories of firms use more differentiation strategy.
By linking three kinds of research literature, i.e., OT and market competition (MC) theory from
management studies and cost management from the accounting research literature, our contributions
are threefold. Firstly, we deliver the attestation that firms that follow dissimilar corporate strategies
indeed present dissimilar degrees of cost stickiness, which extends the literature of cost stickiness in
search through whether the corporate strategy is a basal determinant of earnings management.
Secondly, although previous accounting studies have investigated corporate strategy as a
determinant of compensation [24], budgetary usage [25], accounting control systems [26], and in the
concurrent study as a determinant of tax aggressiveness [27] and financial reporting and auditing
[28], this paper contributes to this stream of literature by providing attestation that corporate strategy
has an even wider application to cost management than previously considered. Finally, this study
shows how the interaction of business strategy and property will impact cost stickiness, which
extends the literature of both property theory and cost management.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and
hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the research methodology and data. Section 4 illustrates
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
2.1. Theoretical Background and Literature Review
The traditional cost behavior models, built-up in the accounting research literature, make a
difference between variable and fixed costs concerning changes in the volume of activities. Variable
costs tend to predict an increase by 1 percent for a 1 percent growth in activity and a decrease by 1
percent for an equal cutback in activity while fixed costs tend not to vary [29]. However, cost
stickiness is the asymmetrical behavior of costs depending on the direction of the sales change.
Meanwhile, Noreen and Soderstrom [30] argue the asymmetric cost behavior possibility as the
‘traditional belief’, recent studies provide proves that cost changes tend not to be inevitably
proportional or even symmetric to changes in sales volume, yet to exhibit “stickiness”. In their
influential study, Anderson et al. [3] build on the results of Noreen and Soderstrom [30,31] and
empirically address the question of whether the relation of cost and volume depends on the direction
of activity changes. They suggest a substitutable cost behavior model that makes the purpose of
giving an explanation of the differentiated reactions to ascending and descending changes in sales
activity. In the model, cost stickiness’s cause is established by two observations. Firstly, substantial
costs increase since managers make their decisions for deliberate resource commitments. Secondly,
switching committed resource degrees tend to be costly since it necessitates suffering resource
adjustment costs, e.g., hiring and lay-off of employees, or disposal/installation costs for apparatus.
They claim that as sales decline, managers would have a favor for retaining certain extents of excess
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capacity costs rather than to reduce the SG&A costs instantly and make and increase on the resources
back at a subsequent time if sales bounce back in the future.
Anderson et al. [3] and following studies emphasize the economic and agency drivers and
behavioral sources for cost stickiness relatively recently. Firstly, diverse literature affirm the
adjustment cost explanation of sticky costs based on empirical tests from proves of the association
between the adjustment cost degree and the cost stickiness degree by utilizing dissimilar empirical
adjustment proxies. Based on the data of hospital, Balakrishnan and Gruca [16] argue higher cost
stickiness in the services for patients relative to support services because of higher adjustment costs
in the core activities. Banker et al. [32] utilize the legislative provisions for employment protection in
disparate countries as a proxy for labor adjustment costs and argue a statistically and economically
significant relationship between cost stickiness at the company level and the employment security
regulation strictness.
In addition, cost stickiness tends to be affected by managers’ expectations. If sales have
decreased in that period, but managers predict sales to be rebounded subsequently, they could abide
by the supplemental capacities rather than suffer the adjustment costs of degrading and then readjusting the resources subsequently when sales augment anew. Empirical investigations for the
managers’ expectations for subsequent sales, as one of the sources for cost stickiness, are conducted.
Anderson et al. [3] utilize revenue decrease in an anterior period and gross domestic product (GDP)
excrescence as a proxy for managers’ optimism. As predicted, they affirm the effect of managerial
expectations for subsequent sales on the extent of cost stickiness. Using growth and recession
industries to proxy with the optimism and pessimism, Banker et al. [6] find the cost stickiness of
optimistic managers is stronger than that of pessimistic managers.
While adjustment costs and managerial expectations are the economic determinants of cost
stickiness, managerial incentives have, too, been exhibited to trigger cost stickiness. Managers tend
to draw private benefits out from deliberately postponing or abstaining from the abatement of
committed resources, e.g., employees and given fixed assets, whilst it could be in the corporate
attention to reduce those resources. Chen et al. [9] reveal that agency costs associated with empirebuilding is likely to bring managers on to abide by to exceed resources and augment cost stickiness.
These empire-building incentives are driven, at least in part, by incentive-based compensation. Kama
and Weiss [8] reveal that when managers encounter incentives to dodge losses or earnings decrement
or to face financial analysts’ earnings predictions, these managers cause descending acclimation of
slack resources for sales abatements to happen faster. Those thoughtful decisions reduce the extent
of cost stickiness.
2.2. Hypotheses Development
The different forms of corporate differentiation strategy mainly include customizing
differentiated products according to consumer demand differences and maintaining product-specific
technology and performance characteristics, among other forms [33]. Companies carry out
specialized investments because they implement differentiation strategy, which gradually shapes the
enterprise’s intangible assets or specific assets in accounting. On the one hand, these specific assets
enhance the companies’ core competitiveness. However, companies are not free to sell or transfer all
of their dedicated resources, such as their researchers’ knowledge, workers with specialized
production capacity, employees who are proficient in product marketing, and managers who are
familiar with corporate culture and practices, as well as the construction of specialized machinery
and equipment [34,35]. Therefore, during a sales downturn, companies following a differentiation
strategy will face higher adjustment costs. These companies cannot cut costs; therefore, they will have
to bring these remaining resources into the next period of production until the adjustment costs
surpass the costs of the balance brought about by cutting resources. In addition, because the
development of specialized assets requires considerable time due to investment and construction,
and because it is difficult to make a one-time purchase in the factor market, the specialized assets
formed by enterprise investment in the supply side lead to lack of flexibility, which is actually the
threshold of a differentiation strategy. Both product innovation and service differentiation strategies
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require a large range of business cost adjustments. Once business shrinks and pre-research &
development (R&D) investments cannot be efficiently digested, corporate cost control will be greatly
impacted. When corporate sales decline, companies that choose differentiation strategy are faced
with higher upward adjustment costs rather than cutting their investment, which means that
companies following differentiation strategy may show higher cost stickiness than others.
The low-cost strategy reduces operating costs through the implementation of the effective scale,
which makes costs lower than competitors’ costs. Companies that choose a low-cost strategy will do
more to control costs in order to provide their products and services at a low price. Porter [1] argues
that companies must build efficient, large-scale production facilities, go all-out to reduce costs, tightly
control costs, and manage R&D, service, marketing, and advertising expenses as well as other costs.
Therefore, when current sales decline, a low-cost strategist tends to cut costs in a timely manner in
order to maintain or increase its market share. Therefore, companies that choose a low-cost strategy
have lower adjustment costs and a more flexible cost structure. In summary, when corporate sales
decline, companies implementing differentiation strategy will maintain the remaining production
capacity, while those with low-cost strategy will quickly cut investments or reduce costs. Therefore,
we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Ceteris paribus, the cost stickiness of firms using a differentiation strategy, will be higher
than that of firms using a low-cost strategy.
The managerial expectation is generally divided into two states, optimism and pessimism. In the
case of optimism, there may be two conditions. First, if future sales maintain growth and managerial
expectation is optimistic, management will tend to expand the scale of production and increase the
commitment to resources. Second, if the future sales volume declines, managers will consider this to
be a temporary adjustment and will choose not to reduce a variety of committed resources because
reducing committed resources will lead to higher adjustment costs [36]. As a result, cost stickiness is
much higher when sales decline than when sales are meeting expectations. However, if sales continue
to decline, managers will become pessimistic. Under such conditions, managers will significantly
reduce investment and production capacity, which will lead to cost anti-stickiness. Therefore, our
second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Ceteris paribus, managers’ optimism will result in cost stickiness, while managers’
pessimism will result in cost anti-stickiness.
Since management expectations may affect cost stickiness, it is possible to adjust the relationship
between corporate strategy and cost stickiness. Based on the two-period sales situation, we analyze
managers’ investment decision-making behavior in firms that use different types of strategy. First,
assuming that sales in year t-1 increase, while sales in year t decrease, managers may still remain
optimistic. In a firm using differentiation strategy, due to the characteristics of asset exclusivity and
higher adjustment costs, managers will not reduce the scale of production but instead forward the
excess production capacity to the next period. Therefore, companies that use differentiation strategy
show higher cost stickiness than others. Firms that use low-cost strategy need to keep low adjustment
costs and a flexible cost structure. In circumstances where manager expectations are optimistic, cost
stickiness for companies using low-cost strategy will be much smaller than that of companies using
differentiation strategy when current sales decline.
However, with two successive periods in which sales decline, managers may become pessimistic
and may reduce the resources committed. Unlike in optimistic scenarios, in these pessimistic
scenarios, companies that choose differentiation strategy will cut the excess capacity on a large scale.
It is difficult to sell existing production capacity in a timely manner because asset exclusivity is too
strong; in other words, valuable resources among companies that implement differentiation strategy
may be less valuable for other businesses. Therefore, using differentiation strategy may lead to lowercost anti-stickiness. For companies that choose a low-cost strategy, their lower adjustment cost and
cost structure will lead them to significantly reduce their resource investment in order to reduce costs.
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Therefore, when managers have pessimistic expectations, companies that have chosen a low cost
strategy will exhibit stronger cost anti-stickiness. Thus, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Ceteris paribus, if management is optimistic, firms that choose differentiation strategy
have higher cost stickiness than those who choose low-cost strategies (H3a); Ceteris paribus, if management is
pessimistic, firms that choose a low-cost strategy have higher cost anti-stickiness than those who choose a
differentiation strategy (H3b).
Heterogeneous ownership types deliver differential incentives for owners to make
commitments in cost-controlling activities, since ownership type commands how these activities’
benefits are augmented to owners [37–39], resulting in differential cost behaviors of companies with
differential owners [40,41].
Agency cost is the main reason behind cost stickiness. We argue that the different agency costs
between state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms in China will affect managers’ decisions when
facing demand uncertainty. Due to differences in the appointment of managers, performance
contracts, and management’s goals, there should be greater agency conflict in state-owned firms than
in non-state-owned firms, which would, therefore, result in higher cost stickiness in the former than
in the latter.
Additionally, state-owned firms have a more social responsibility and more protection for
employees, which leads to an inelastic cost structure. To be specific, when implementing differential
strategy, which requires specialized equipment and employees, managers in state-owned firms find
it more difficult to cut down costs by layoffs or selling specialized equipment than managers in nonstate-owned firms do. Therefore, cost stickiness in the former is higher than in the latter. Holzhacker
et al. [42] investigated the impact of fixed-price regulation on the cost structures in the healthcare
industry and found that a change to fixed-price regulation imposes cost pressures and increases
operational risk because the firms’ revenue function is much less related to the cost function. In
response, firms will make two broad changes to their cost structures. The first is to increase cost
elasticity, and the second is to decrease the extent of cost asymmetry.
Our context of emerging market firms, particularly Chinese firms, is in line with Ramamurti and
Hillemann’s [43], （p. 40）argument that “[t]he government is not just another institution – it is a key
institution that shapes many other institutions in the country…that affect the international
competitiveness of firms” since these firms are responsive to cost elasticity and cost asymmetry.
Therefore:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Ceteris paribus, compared to non-state-owned firms, a differentiation strategy in stateowned firms has more impact on cost stickiness.
3. Research Methodology and Data
3.1. Econometrics Specification
Most studies in the literature adopt the cost stickiness model developed by Anderson et al. [3],
which is based on a piecewise-linear relation (A piecewise linear function is a function defined on an
(possibly unbounded) interval of real numbers, in a way that there is a collection of intervals on each
of which the function is an affine function [44]. An affine function represents vector-valued functions
of the form, such as f(x_1,...,x_n)=A_1x_1+...+A_nx_n+b [45]. The coefficients can be scalars or dense
or sparse matrices. The constant term is a scalar or a column vector.) between logarithm changes in
costs and concurrent logarithm changes in sales.
ln
where ln(

= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln(

) + 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln(

) + 𝜀 (1)

) is the logarithm change in costs of firm i in year t, ln(

(1)
) is the logarithm

change in sales revenue, the cost is the sum of selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs, and
operating cost. Rev is the sales revenues of firm i in year t. Dec is a dummy variable taking the value
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1 if sales revenue decreases relative to it in the last year and zero otherwise, and ε is an error term.
The slope coefficient β1 approximates the percentage change in costs for a one percent sales
increase, characterizing the relative importance of variable costs. The coefficient β2 captures the
degree of asymmetry in cost response to sales decreases versus increases. Therefore, (β1+β2)
represents the extent of the change in costs with a one-unit decrease in sales. If a firm exhibits cost
stickiness, β2 is expected to be negative because managers with optimistic expectations may not
restrict slack resources as they believe the decreased sales will not last long, and the adjusted cost
may exceed earnings due to the reduction of these slack resources. However, some companies with
pessimistic managers may appear “anti-stickiness”. When managers initially realize that sales are
declining and are pessimistic about subsequent sales, they will significantly cut back on costs when
sales decrease in the current period, which makes β2 positive.
To test our hypothesis H1 and H4, we modified model (1) by adding a strategy variable and
other control variables. Anderson et al. [3] argue that the macroeconomic environment, denoted by
the economic growth, as well as firm-specific characteristics such as asset intensity (ratio of total
assets to sales revenue) and employee intensity (ratio of number of employees to sales revenue), will
impact the degree of cost stickiness.
ln

cost
cost

Rev
Rev
Rev
+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln
+ 𝛽 Strategy ⋅ ln
Rev
Rev
Rev
Asset
Rev
⋅ ln
+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln
Rev
Rev
Rev
Emp
Rev
+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln
⋅ ln
+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ Suc_Dec ⋅ ln
Rev
Rev
Rev
Rev
+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ GDP ⋅ ln
+𝜀
Rev

= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln

(2)

where 𝑆tr𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 is the strategy position. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 , 𝐸𝑚𝑝 , and 𝐺𝐷𝑃 represent the total asset, the
number of employees, and the growth rate of GDP in year t, respectively. Suc_Dect is the successive
sales revenue decrease for two years.
We also incorporate the strategy variable to investigate its indirect impact on the cost change for
robustness as follows:
ln

cost
cost

= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln

Rev
Rev

+ 𝛽 Strategy + 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

Rev
+ 𝛽 Dec
Rev
Rev
⋅ ln
Rev

Rev
Asset
+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln
Rev
Rev
Rev
Emp
+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln
⋅ ln
Rev
Rev
Rev
Rev
+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ GDP ⋅ ln
+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ Suc_Dec ⋅ ln
Rev
Rev
⋅ Strategy ⋅ ln

(3)

+𝜀

where Dec is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the sales revenue decreases in year t compared to t1, and otherwise equals 0. Therefore, β1 in formula (2) and β2 in (3) measure the change of cost
relative to the sales revenue increase of 1%; in other words, when sales increase by 1%, costs will rise
by β1% in (1) or β2% in (2). (β1 +β2) represents the percentage of decrease in costs when sales decline
1 unit; when sales fall 1%, the costs go down (β1 + β2) %. When costs exhibit stickiness, then β2＞
β1+β2 and β1＜0; when costs exhibit anti-stickiness, then β2＜β1+β2 and β1＞0. Based on H1, β3 in
the model (2) and β4 in (3) capture the impact of strategy on cost stickiness. When these coefficients
increase, the impact of differentiation strategy likewise increases. In that case, we expect these
parameters to be negative. To test our H4, we divide the sample into two sub-samples, state-owned
firms and non-state-owned firms. We then run regressions (2) and (3) within these two sub-samples
and compare the magnitude of the main coefficients between them.
To test H2, H3a, and H3b, following Banker et al. [46], we construct a model to investigate the
impact of strategy on cost stickiness under different managerial expectations:
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= 𝛽 +𝛽
+𝛽
⋅𝐷
+𝛽

⋅I

⋅ Dec ⋅ I
⋅ ln

Rev
Rev

⋅ ln

Rev
Rev

+𝛽

⋅ Strategy ⋅ ln
+𝛽

⋅ Dec ⋅ Dec

⋅ Dec ⋅ I
Rev
Rev

⋅ Dec ⋅ I
⋅ Strategy ⋅ ln

⋅ ln
Rev
Rev

⋅ ln

Rev
Rev

+𝛽
Rev
Rev

(4)

+𝜀

where It－1 and Dect-1 are dummy variables. It－1 equals 1 when sales increase in year t-1 and otherwise
0. Dect-1 takes the value 1 if sales decrease in year t-1 and otherwise 0. In model (4), β1PInc captures the
percentage of cost increase when sales go up 1% in an optimistic management scenario. (β1PInc + β2PInc)
represents the percentage of cost decrease if sales decline 1 unit in an optimistic management scenario.
β1PDnc measures the percentage of cost increase when sales increase 1% in a pessimistic management
scenario. (β1PDec + β2PDec) represents the percentage of cost decrease if sales decline 1 unit in a
pessimistic management scenario. H2 expects that a firm will exhibit cost stickiness if managers are
optimistic about the future. Therefore, if β1PInc ＞ (β1PInc +β2PInc), then β2PInc < 0; in other words, β2PInc is
expected to be significantly negative while costs will appear anti-stickiness under a pessimistic
scenario in which β1PDec < (β1PDec + β2PDec) and then β2PDnc >0 and β2PDec is expected to be significantly
positive. If β1PInc and β1PDec are significantly positive, we anticipate β1PInc > β1PDec, which implies that
the managers with different expectations about the future have different preferences regarding
investment. Under H3a and H3b, we expect β3PInc and β3PDec to be significantly negative.
3.2. Variables and Data
3.2.1. Variables
There are essentially two ways to measure the cost stickiness, a direct way, and an indirect way.
The direct way was developed by Weiss [47] and adopted by Kama and Weiss [8], Balakrishnan et al.
[48], and others. This method measures cost stickiness on a rolling basis as the difference between the
mean of the quarterly cost function slope under upward adjustment made over quarters t-8 through
t and the mean of the quarterly cost function slope under downward adjustments made over the
same period. The stickiness measure reflects the difference between the rate of cost decreases for
quarters with decreasing sales, and the rate of cost increases for quarters with increasing sales. If costs
are sticky, meaning that they decrease less when sales fall than they increase when sales rise by
equivalent amounts, then the stickiness variable will have a positive value, with a higher value
representing stickier cost behavior.
However, most prior literature has adopted the indirect measurement of cost stickiness, which
uses the percentage of cost change. Considering that cost change might vary with many other factors
such as a managerial decision or cost management, we intend to use the percentage of the sale and
administration cost change along with the percentage of operating cost change to measure cost
stickiness.
The first dependent variable is a business strategy (Strategy). Existing literature identify business
strategies using two main methods. The first method is the questionnaire that surveys corporate
strategy. For example, Dess and Davis [49] used a questionnaire to identify a firm’s strategy. On the
other hand, some articles use existing data to construct an index that allows them to recognize a firm’s
strategy position. In our paper, following Bentley et al. [28], we construct a discrete Strategy
composite measure, which proxies for the organization’s business strategy. Higher Strategy scores
represent companies with differentiation strategies and lower scores represent companies with low
cost strategies. Similar to Bentley et al. [28], we utilize the following features for the composite
measure for Strategy, i.e., first, “the ratio of research and development (R&D) to sales”, second, “the
ratio of employees to sales”, third, “a historical growth measure (one-year percentage change in total
sales)”, fourth, “the ratio of marketing (SG&A) to sales”, fifth, “a measure of employee fluctuations
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(standard deviation of total employees)”, and, sixth, “a measure of capital intensity (net PPE scaled
by total assets)”, respectively.
The second dependent variable is state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Following the literature such
as Hall [40], Anderson et al. [3], the dummy variable SOE equivalent to 1 if the government owns a
certain percentage of the firm’s shares while 0 otherwise.
And then following the Anderson et al. [3], we use a dummy variable Dec that equals 1 if sales
decrease in the current year and 0 otherwise to define the sales decrease and use Suc_Dect which
equals 1 if sales revenue declined in the preceding period; otherwise 0 to define the preceding sales
revenue decline.
We, too, include control variables common in the literature which may affect the cost stickiness
such as (1) China annual real growth rate (GDP) captured by the effect of macroeconomic growth, (2)
employee intensity (Emp) represented by the ratio of the number of employees to sales revenue, (3)
asset intensity (Cap) captured by the ratio of assets to sales revenue, (4) industrial effect (Indy) and
year effect (Year). These control variables are commonly used in many studies, which indicate they
have effects on cost stickiness. All the variables are defined in Table 1.
Table 1. Variable definitions.
Variable
Independent
variables

Dependent
variables

Variable Definition

log(

SGAi ,t
SGAi ,t −1

The logarithm of change in selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs

ln(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥
/𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥 )
Strategy
)
ln(
Dect
Suc_Dect
SOEs

Control
variables

)

Emp
Cap
GDP
IND

The logarithm of change in operating costs
Bentley, Omer and Sharp’s [28] strategy measures
Logarithm of change in sales revenue
Dummy variable, equals 1 when the sales of a firm in year t decrease compared to the
sales in the prior year t-1; otherwise, 0
Dummy variable, equals 1 for firm-year observations when sales revenue declined in
the preceding period; otherwise, 0.
Dummy variable SOE equals 1 if the government owns a certain percentage of the
firm’s shares, while 0 otherwise.
Defined as the ratio of the number of employees to sales revenue
Defined as the ratio of the total assets to sales revenue.
Defined as the annual growth rate of China’s real gross domestic product
Industrial dummy variable for 72 three-digit SIC industries

3.2.2. Sample Selection and Data Sources
This paper uses annual data from the Wind database and the China Stock Market & Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database nonfinancial listed firms for the years 2002–2015. In line with Borisova
et al. [50], the present paper defines direct state ownership to involve ownership by provincial or
municipal governments, such as non-central government entities, and entities built-up particularly
to maneuver the central government’s funds. In doer to secure the accurateness and validity for our
data, we collect information regarding the companies’ state shareholders from annual reports as well
as websites. The verification proceeding spans all available annual reports for all the firms. If there is
no information regarding corporate shareholders, this paper depends on the CSMAR data. Following
Anderson et al. [51] and Banker et al. [52], the paper delete firm-year data s with missing, zero, or
negative values for revenues, labor costs and total assets, as well as firms with sales increase greater
than 50% or decrease more than 33%, since such large changes may indicate mergers and divestitures
[52]. Moreover, we delete firms with missing values regarding state ownership and require that firms
utilize the same reporting standard within two previous years. Lastly, continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. As a result, lastly, we obtain 20,945 firm-year observations.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of our main variables. The average SG&A (Selling,
General and Administrative Expenses) cost is 17.54% of sales, with a standard deviation of 18.29%
and a median of 12.68%. The average operating cost is 92.35% of sales revenue, with a standard
deviation of 19.92% and a median of 92%. Average Dec is 0.265, which implies that 26.5% of firms’
sales experiences decrease while most firms gain an increase in sales between Year 2002 and 2015.
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The average strategy score is 18 (the maximum is 30 and the minimum equals 6), indicating that most
companies choose differentiation strategy.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable
Sales revenue
Selling, general, and administrative costs
Operating costs
SG&A costs as a percentage of sales revenue
Operating costs as a percentage of sales revenue
𝑅𝑒 𝑣
)
ln(
𝑅𝑒 𝑣

log(

SGAi ,t
SGAi ,t −1

ln(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥 /𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥
Strategy
Dec

)
)

Mean
64.80
5.36
58.00
17.54
92.35

P50
11.50
1.40
10.20
12.68
92

Sd
585.00
34.40
504.00
18.29
19.92

Min
0.00
0.01
0.02
1.664
47.22

Max
28400.00
1480.00
25600.00
131.2
212.5

0.128

0.122

0.346

-1.121

1.55

0.145

0.135

0.317

-0.997

1.343

0.139
18
0.265

0.128
18
0

0.32
4.596
0.441

-0.978
6
0

1.398
30
1

Note: Sales and SG&A costs are in millions of RMB.

4. Empirical Results
We first investigate the effect of strategy on cost stickiness. We regress our model using two
alternative dependent variables: SA&G and Cost. In Table 3, we estimate three different models using
the GLS method (In order to avoid estimation biases, we used the generalized least squares (GLS)
regression [53] to examine our hypotheses regarding the pattern of the data. Our data have the
pattern of a time-series database, which violates the traditional ordinary least squares (OLS)
assumptions, including homoscedasticity and no autocorrelation of the error term assumption [54].
In this case, OLS and weighted least squares can be statistically inefficient or even inferred
misleading). The results are listed in Column I through Column III. The estimated result in Column
I is based on the model used by Anderson et al. [3], which shows a β1 of 0.427 and a β2 of −0.211. The
results are similar to Anderson et al. [3], Zheng and Hao [55], and Lei et al. [56]. Its economic meaning
is that SA&G costs will increase by 43.7% when sales are up 1%, while they decrease only by 21.6%
(equals 43.7% minus 21.1%) when sales are down 1%. The results in Column II and III are for Models
(2) and (3). The strategy coefficient β3 is −0.015 and −0.012, both significant at 5% and 10%,
respectively. This supports our first hypothesis that cost stickiness increases with the level of a
differentiation strategy. We further regress Models (2) and (3) using fixed effects regression (A fixed
effects regression model is a statistical model in which the model parameters are fixed or non-random
quantities [57]. Random effects and mixed regression models in which all or some of the model
parameters are considered as random variables are contrasting with this fixed effect regression model
[57]) in Column IV and Ⅴ. The results are similar to GLS estimates, but the coefficients are slightly
smaller. The cost stickiness coefficient β2 is −0.359 and −0.430, both significant at 5% and 10%,
respectively. The strategy coefficient β3 is −0.017 and −0.015, both significant at 1%. Once again, these
results support H1. In this study, the GLS and fixed effects regression procedures were performed in
STATA 15 by using the program’s xt family of commands, which are suitable for handling
longitudinal panel data.
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Table 3. The relationship between strategy position and cost stickiness: using the logarithm of the
change in SG&A (Selling, General and Administrative Expenses) as a dependent variable.
D.V

GLS
Ⅱ
0.413***
(47.00)
−0.377*
(−1.79)
−0.015***
(−4.25)
−0.036**
(-2.57)
−0.037***
(−3.04)
0.112***
(4.89)
−0.001*
(−1.71)

Ⅰ
0.427***
(26.66)
−0.211***
(−7.66)

Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Stategy *
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Asset*
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Emp*
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Suc_Dec*
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Gdp
Strategy
_cons

0.077***
(24.80)
20945
0.154
No
No

N
r2_a
Industries effect
Year effect

Fixed Effects
Ⅳ
Ⅴ
0.423***
0.418***
(42.69)
(41.20)
−0.359*
−0.430*
(−1.75)
(−1.85)
−0.017***
−0.015***
(−4.52)
(−3.76)
−0.042***
−0.043***
(−2.67)
(−2.72)
−0.035***
−0.038***
(−2.62)
(−2.80)
0.125***
0.127***
(5.09)
(5.16)
−0.001*
−0.001*
(−1.79)
(−1.76)
0.002**
(2.45)
0.074***
0.036**
(20.30)
(2.29)
20945
20945
0.036
0.036
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Ⅲ
0.409***
(45.93)
−0.434**
(−2.06)
−0.012***
(−3.32)
−0.037***
(−2.66)
−0.038***
(−3.11)
0.112***
(4.91)
−0.001*
(−1.77)
0.001***
(3.07)
0.059***
(6.71)
20945
0.160
No
No

0.084***
(25.78)
20945
0.160
No
No

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively,
in two-tailed tests. The sample is collected from China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR)
database from 2002–2015 winsorized at the 1% and 99%. The industries effect means industry-fixed
effects (with industry dummies). Following the previous literature such as Banker and Chen [22],
Kitching et al. [58], Li and Zheng [59], and Prabowo et al. [60], we use the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) to control for industry effects on firms’ cost behavior across all firms in each
industry. To be specific, the SIC3 industry classification used for industry fixed effects is based on
three-digit SIC codes. Seventy-two industries in total are controlled across all models such as A01
professional technical service industry, B11 agriculture, C22 furniture manufacturing, E48 power,
heat production and supply industry, and so on. Also, the dependent variable is the logarithm of
change in SG&A (Selling, General and Administrative Expenses). Three different models are
estimated using the generalized least squares (GLS) regression method, and the results are listed in
Column Ⅰ through Ⅲ. To handle fixed effects, we further regress Models Ⅱ and III using generalized
least squares (GLS) and fixed effects regression with the results in Columns Ⅳ and Ⅴ.

Model Ⅰ: ln

= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln(

Model Ⅱ: ln

= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln

⋅ ln

⋅ ln

+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ Suc_Dec ⋅ ln

= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln

+
+

+ 𝛽 Strategy + 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

+

+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

⋅ ln

+

𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ Suc_Dec ⋅ ln

+

𝛽 Dec ⋅ GDP ⋅ ln

(6)

+

𝛽 Dec ⋅ Strategy ⋅ ln
⋅ ln

(5)

+𝜀

𝛽 Dec ⋅ GDP ⋅ ln
Model Ⅲ: ln

)+𝜀

+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

𝛽 Strategy ⋅ ln
𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

) + 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln(

(7)

+𝜀

Considering that SA&G costs fall under the category of period expenses that are sensitive to the
volume of business activities, we then re-examine the association between strategy position and cost
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stickiness of Model (2) and Model (3) using the logarithm of operating costs as the dependent
variable. We use both GLS and fixed effect regressions and report our results in Table 4. The
coefficient of strategy is -0.008 and -0.01, both significant at 5% under GLS regression. The coefficient
becomes slightly smaller at -0.012 and -0.013, respectively. Both are significant at 1%. These results
imply that the differentiation strategy in the first quartile is 7.2% (0.012 * 6 = 0.072) in Column IV, or
7.8% (0.013 * 6 = 0.078) in Column Ⅴ, greater than in the third quartile. The difference in cost stickiness
between the first quartile and the third quartile is up to 0.288 (equals 0.012 * 24) in column Ⅳ, or 0.
312 (0.013 * 24) in Column Ⅴ, which further supports our first hypothesis. The signs of other variables
are consistent with those in Table 3.
Table 4. The relationship between strategy position and cost stickiness: using the logarithm of the
change in the operating costs as a dependent variable.

D.V
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Ln(Revt/Revt-1)

GLS
Ⅱ
0.858***
(93.06)
−0.646***
(−3.02)
−0.008**
(−2.19)
−0.035**
(−2.01)
−0.061***
(−4.68)
−0.045*
(−1.89)
−0.000***
(−3.05)

Ⅰ
0.872***
(104.22)
−0.117***
(−6.75)

Dec*Stategy *
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Asset*
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Emp*
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Suc_Dec*
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Gdp

Ⅲ
0.860***
(95.65)
−0.621***
(−2.91)
−0.010**
(−2.45)
−0.034**
(−1.98)
−0.061***
(−4.66)
−0.045*
(−1.90)
−0.000***
(−3.01)
−0.001***
(−2.69)
0.038***
(7.94)
20945
0.813
No
No

Strategy
_cons
N
r2_a
Industries effect
Year effect

0.019***
(12.39)
20947
0.806
No
No

0.027***
(13.82)
20945
0.813
No
No

Fixed Effects
Ⅳ
Ⅴ
0.859***
0.861***
(91.01)
(92.25)
−0.731***
−0.702***
(−3.23)
(−3.10)
−0.012***
−0.013***
(−2.90)
(−3.09)
−0.030
−0.029
(−1.60)
(−1.58)
−0.071***
−0.070***
(−5.08)
(−5.02)
−0.027
−0.028
(−1.15)
(−1.18)
−0.000
−0.000
(−1.08)
(−1.06)
−0.001*
(−1.81)
0.024***
0.039***
(10.62)
(4.42)
20945
20945
0.805
0.805
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively,
in two-tailed tests. The sample is collected from CSMAR database from 2002–2015 winsorized at the
1% and 99%.

The dependent variable is the logarithm of the change in operating costs. Three different models
are estimated using the GLS regression method and the results are presented in Column Ⅰ through
Ⅲ. To handle fixed effects, we further regress Models Ⅱ and III using GLS and fixed effects regression
with results reported in Column Ⅳ and Ⅴ.
Model Ⅰ: ln

= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln(

Model Ⅱ: ln

= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln

⋅ ln

⋅ ln

+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ Suc_Dec ⋅ ln

𝛽 Dec ⋅ GDP ⋅ ln

)+𝜀

+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

𝛽 Strategy ⋅ ln
𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

) + 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln(

+𝜀

(8)

+
+
+

(9)
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= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln

𝛽 Dec ⋅ Strategy ⋅ ln
𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

⋅ ln

+ 𝛽 Strategy + 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln
+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ ln

+

⋅ ln

+

+ 𝛽 Dec ⋅ Suc_Dec ⋅ ln

+

𝛽 Dec ⋅ GDP ⋅ ln

(10)

+𝜀

We further conduct an empirical analysis of the relationship between managerial expectation
and cost stickiness. To test our second hypothesis, we regress Model (5) with the logarithm change
in SA&G costs as a dependent variable, using the GLS and fixed effect regressions, respectively. The
results are reported in Column Ⅰ through Ⅲ in Table 5. The two types of managerial expectation
coefficients are measured by the coefficient of β1PInc (0.471, significant at 1%) and β1PDec (0.365,
significant at 1%), respectively. Costs increase 0.471%, with sales rising 1% under the optimistic
scenario, while costs increase 0.365%, with sales rising 1% under the pessimistic scenario, which
implies that marginal change in costs due to optimistic managers is 0.006% (0.471%–0.365%).
Meanwhile, β2PInc is -0.27, significant at 5%, and β2PDec is 0.237, significant at 1%. Additionally, (β1PInc
+β2PInc) = 0.2, which is (0.471–0.270), and (β1PDec + β2PDec) = 0.602, which is (0.365 + 0.237). The former
means that costs decrease by 0.2% if sales decline 1% under the optimistic scenario, while the latter
indicates that costs decline 0.602% if sales decrease 1% under the pessimistic scenario. Because (β1PInc
+β2PInc) < (β1PDec + β2PDec) and β2PInc < 0, β2PDec > 0, optimistic managerial expectations will result in cost
stickiness, while pessimistic managerial expectations will result in cost anti-stickiness. We reexamine
the results with the logarithm of the change in operating costs as the dependent variables using GLS
and fixed effect regressions. We find that β2PInc equals -0.288 and -0.374, respectively and both are
significant at 1% while β2PDec is 0.460 and 0.482, both significant at 1%, which furthers our second
hypothesis.
Table 5. The relationship between strategy position, managerial expectation, and cost stickiness.
Ⅰ
OLS
0.496***
(30.9)
0.357***
(15.89)

Ln(SGAt/SGAt-1)
Ⅱ
OLS
0.488***
(30.21)
0.352***
(15.54)

Ⅲ
FE
0.471***
(26.27)
0.365***
(15.71)

Ln(OPECt/OPECt-1)
Ⅳ
Ⅴ
OLS
FE
0.905***
0.899***
(133.05)
(117.92)
0.824***
0.828***
(63.8)
(62.61)

It-1*Dt*ln(Revt/Revt-1)

−0.313***
(−9.12)

−0.258**
(−2.49)

−0.270**
(−2.26)

−0.288***
(−5.72)

−0.374***
(−6.99)

D t-1*Dt*ln(Revt/Revt-1)

0.126***
(3.41)

0.348***
(2.61)
−0.029***

0.237***
(3.6)
−0.032***

0.460***
(5.52)
−0.019***

0.482***
(5.36)
−0.025***

(−5.58)
−0.022***
(−3.51)

(−5.43)
−0.020***
(−2.88)

(−6.73)
−0.028***
(−6.43)

(−8.39)
−0.030***
(−6.35)

0.076***
(24.63)
20947
0.164
No
No

0.073***
(19.55)
20947
0.143
No
No

0.020***
(14.31)
20947
0.813
Yes
Yes

0.020***
(10.97)
20947
0.805
Yes
Yes

D.V
It-1*ln(Revt/Revt-1)
D t-1*ln(Revt/Revt-1)

I t-1*Dt*Strategy*
ln(Revt/Revt-1)
D t-1*Dt*Stratgy*
ln(Revt/Revt-1)
_cons
N
r2_a
Industries effect
Year effect

0.073***
(24.12)
20947
0.159
No
No

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively,
in two-tailed tests. We regress Model (5) with the the logarithmic change in SA&G costs as dependent
variables using fixed effects regressions.

Next, we provide empirical analysis on the association between strategy position, cost stickiness
and managerial expectations. Since managerial expectations affect cost stickiness, this may moderate
the relationship between strategy position and cost stickiness. To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate
the models and report the results in Table 5. The coefficient of It－1*Dt*strategy*Ln (Revt/Revt－1), β3PInc,
is −0.029 and −0.032 in Column Ⅱ and Ⅲ, respectively, while the coefficient of It-1*Dt*Ln(Revt/Revt－1),
β2PInc, is −0.258 and −0.270, respectively. Therefore, the absolute value of (β3PInc + β2PInc) is greater than
the absolute value of β2PInc. These results imply that optimistic managerial expectations will
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strengthen cost stickiness with more differentiation, which supports H3a. When cost stickiness of a
firm choosing a differentiation strategy is greater than that of a firm choosing cost leadership strategy,
optimistic managers will view sales decreases as temporary adjustments, and thus they will be
reluctant to cut back costs. Therefore, optimistic managerial expectations will increase cost stickiness.
In addition, the coefficient of Dt－1 * Dt * Strategy * Ln(Revt/Revt－1), β3PDec, is −0.022 and −0.02
(significant at 1%), respectively. β2PDec is 0.348 and 0.237 in Column Ⅱ and Ⅲ, and (β2PDec + β3PDec) is
0.326 and 0.217, respectively. These results indicate that pessimistic managerial expectations will
decrease cost stickiness, which supports hypothesis H3b. Similarly, we test the results using the
logarithm of the change in operating costs and the estimators in Column Ⅳ and Ⅴ, respectively. These
results are consistent with our previously stated results. For example, β3PInc is −0.019 and −0.025 (both
significant at 1%), while β3PDec is −0.028 and −0.030 (both significant at 1%). The results provide further
robust evidence supporting H3b.
Finally, H4 argues that equity will affect cost stickiness under different strategies. To test this
hypothesis, we divide the full sample into two sub-samples, state-owned, and non-owned firms. We
run regressions using robust standard error based on model (2) and model (3), and the results are
reported in Table 6. We want to test how equity affects the effect of differential strategy on cost
stickiness; hence, we have to merge the equity data into the sample. Therefore, the value of the
variable state is 1 when firms are state-owned and 0 if not. The equity data is only available from 2003
to 2014; therefore, our observations are reduced to 14,273, with 8,174 state-owned firms and 6,099
non-state-owned firms.
Table 6. The relationship between strategy and cost stickiness under state-owned and non-stateowned firms.
D.V
lnRev
Dec*Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
Dec*Stategy *
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)
DecAssetlnRev
DecEmplnRev
DecSuclnRev
DecGdp

I
II
State-Owned Firms
0.876***
0.994***
(87.61)
(121.58)
−0.625***
−0.409***
(−4.33)
(−3.01)
−0.004**

−0.003**

−0.003*

−0.002*

(−2.85)
−0.039**
(−2.35)
−0.043***
(−4.20)
0.039*
(1.87)
−0.001**
(−2.45)

(−2.92)
−0.025*
(1.90)
−0.023**
(−2.32)
0.057***
(3.00)
0.001
(0.02)
−0.001*
(−1.83)
0.004
(1.58)
YES
YES
8174
0.894
3542.113

(−1.82)
−0.039*
(−2.01)
−0.073***
(−5.25)
−0.029**
(−1.99)
−0.001**
(−1.98)

(−1.81)
−0.026**
(−2.11)
−0.010*
(−1.86)
−0.009
(−0.42)
0.001*
(1.78)
−0.001*
(−1.88)
0.002
(0.32)
YES
YES
6099
0.874
3551.244

Strategy
_cons
Industries effect
Year effect
N
r2_a
F

III
IV
Non-State-Owned Firms
0.818***
0.975***
(56.65)
(92.79)
−0.918***
−0.075
(−4.67)
(−0.45)

0.016***
(9.03)
YES
YES
8174
0.878
3009.598

0.024***
(8.52)
YES
YES
6099
0.814
1789.908

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively,
in two-tailed tests. We regress Model (2) and (3) with the a logarithm change in operating costs as
dependent variable using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.

The results in Columns I and III control for the strategy, and Columns II and IV incorporate the
strategy. First, the coefficients of Dec * Stategy * Ln(Revt/Revt-1) is -0.004 in state-owned firms and 0.003 in non-state-owned firms, respectively, and both are significant at 1% without incorporating
the sole strategy. The magnitude of these results is 33.3% greater in the state-owned sample than in
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the non-state-owned sample. We then control for the strategy, and the coefficients of Dec * Strategy *
Ln(Revt/Revt-1) are -0.003 in state-owned firms and significant at 1% but reduced to -0.002 in a nonstate-owned sample and significant at 10%. This means that strategy has a stronger effect on cost
stickiness in state-owned firms than in non-state-owned firms, which supports our fourth hypothesis.
This study conducts several robustness checks. First, this paper uses balanced panel data and
runs GLS and fixed-effects regressions. Second, differences between SOEs and private firms may
increase a possible bias in the estimates, due to the potentially mis-specified relation between the
dependent and independent variables [61]. The paper, therefore, uses a propensity score matching
(PSM) to match SOEs with comparable private firms by selecting the private firms that are most
similar to SOEs, according to the distribution of observed covariates [62]. The paper alters Borisova
et al.’s [50] procedure and utilizes size, sales growth, return on assets, leverage, stock value traded as
a percentage of GDP, and industry to fit the observations for SOEs with them of private firm. This
study reruns the regression Equation on our PSM observations. Third, cost behavior tends to change
during economic crises [32]. Thus, we rerun the regression until the year 2007, which was before the
latest financial crisis. Finally, to address the problematic possibility of endogeneity that leads to
inconsistent regression estimation, this study utilizes an alternative estimation method known as
instrumental variables or equivalently two-stage least squares (2SLS) [63]. Accordingly, we introduce
an instrument variable inducing changes in the explanatory variable but has no independent impact
on our dependent variable; thus, allowing us to reveal the causal effect of the explanatory variable
on our dependent variable [63]. Yet, we find that the results are similar to our previous empirical
results. Although the level of significance may be decreased using the balanced panel data, the signs
of the coefficients are consistent and the similarity with the significance level, which further illustrates
that our results are robust.
In Table 7, we summarize the results of the regression analyses from hypotheses 1 to 4. We find
that all the hypotheses are supported except for H3b.
Table 7. Summary of the results of the regression analyses: Hypotheses 1–4.
Hypotheses
H1

H2

H3a

H3b

H4

Hypotheses
The cost stickiness of firms using differentiation
strategy will be higher than that of firms using
low-cost strategy.
Managers’ optimism will result in cost
stickiness, while managers’ pessimism will
result in cost anti-stickiness.
If management is optimistic, firms that choose
differentiation strategy have higher cost
stickiness than those that choose low-cost
strategies
If management is pessimistic, firms that choose a
low-cost strategy have higher cost anti-stickiness
than those that choose a differentiation strategy
Compared to non-state-owned firms, a
differentiation strategy in a state-owned firms
has a more impact on cost stickiness.

Main Findings
The cost stickiness of firms choosing
differentiation strategy is higher than that of
those choosing a low-cost strategies.
Optimistic management expectations will
strengthen cost stickiness, while pessimistic
expectations will weaken cost anti-stickiness.
If management is optimistic, cost stickiness of
firms choosing a differentiation strategy is
higher than that of those choosing a low-cost
strategy

Support

Support

Support

Do not find evidence.

Reject

State-owned firms have stronger cost stickiness
than non-state-owned firms adopting a
differentiation strategy.

Support

5. Conclusion and Implications
5.1. Conclusions
Following a competitive strategy for business development is the key to a business’s success.
Based on data of China A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2002–2015, we
investigate the relationship between a firm's competitive strategy and cost stickiness, and we find the
following results.
First, the results show that the cost stickiness of firms that choose differentiation strategy is
higher than that of those choosing low-cost strategies. This is because following differentiation
strategy maintains or increases a high-profit margin by providing quality products or services to
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customers through a centralized competition [33], which requires companies to invest massively in
crucial areas such as product development, brand building, and advertising. On the other hand, cost
strategy requires more effort to control costs in order to provide products or services with the lowest
possible price, which means that firms using cost strategy must focus on improving yield and
capacity utilization and minimize indirect costs and other expenses, based on the actual cost of
competitors.
Second, when managers make decisions about whether and how to adjust their resource
capacity, they will make appropriate investment decisions based on current and future sales.
Therefore, a manager’s expectations for the future will affect firm investment decisions and costs. To
be specific, optimistic management expectations will strengthen cost stickiness, while pessimistic
expectations will weaken cost anti-stickiness. If the management is optimistic, the cost stickiness of
companies choosing a differentiation strategy will be higher than that of those choosing a low-cost
strategy. Conversely, if the management is pessimistic, the cost anti-stickiness of companies choosing
a low-cost strategy will be higher than that of firms choosing a differentiation strategy.
Finally, state-owned equity affects the extent of the effect of differentiation strategy on cost
stickiness. State-owned firms, which hold more GCAs than non-state-owned firms, have stronger
cost stickiness than non-state-owned firms, even if both categories of firms use differentiation
strategy more.
5.2. Theoretical and Managerial/Policy Implications
This paper has some theoretical implications. First, this paper is one of the limited studies that
connect OT and MC theory to accounting studies for cost management research. Second, the paper
makes a validation for the fact that different business strategists indeed present dissimilar levels of
cost stickiness, and this reveals if the corporate strategy is a crucial factor for earnings management.
Third, the present study proves the validation that corporate strategy has an even wider application
to cost management than anteriorly regarded. Lastly, but not least, this paper exhibits how the
interplay of corporate strategy and property tends to influence cost stickiness as an extension of both
the property theory and the cost management literature.
This study also has several managerial and policy implications. Both the corporate strategy
chosen and the ownership are core factors that influence cost stickiness. The corporate strategy of
firms will influence managers’ decisions about resource commitment and further reflect how cost
management is controlled. Therefore, this internal mechanism can provide some microcosmic action
reference for companies to implement cost management and improve the corporate governance
mechanism.
Adding to the existing literature’s understanding of these mechanisms, at the level of policy
operation, our study provides a new way of cognition to explore the effectiveness and rationality of
strategic positioning and management expectations. In addition, it provides innovative ideas for a
further strategic selection, investment decision, and cost control. The empirical results show that
different corporate strategies and ownership will produce different cost behaviors. Therefore, to
enhance the strategic positioning of companies and the effectiveness and rationality of management
expectations, managers must correctly understand changes in the firm’s external environment,
thereby achieving effective controls of costs. Simultaneously, firms should guide and standardize the
business process, actively play their roles in the market, and further optimize and improve their
internal and external environment, thus allowing them to sustain harmonious and healthy
development.
Another way our study contributes to the literature is that it addresses government-created
institutional advantages, which are considered “probably the most important variable suggested by
the research” on internationalizing emerging market firms, in particular Chinese firms [43, p. 42].
This type of institutional advantage “is relevant in most emerging economies because governments
usually play a strategic role in developing economies.” The various “channels through which GCAs
work are available to all government, even if other countries are not as big as China or not as
competent at using these policy levers,” and the prominent role of state-owned firms among
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internationalizing Chinese firms is just one aspect of China’s institutional advantages [43, p. 42].
Chinese firms’ business strategy, state-owned equity, and cost stickiness are meaningful in China’s
institutional aspects linked to GCAs.
Finally, as an extension of our findings, we need to speculate that cost stickiness can be directly
and indirectly related to economic growth [64], political uncertainty [65], and credit risk [66].
Managers at internationalizing emerging market firms, particularly Chinese firms, should think over
how these factors can be related to their institutional advantages.
5.3. Limitations and Future Research
This study has meaningful theoretical and managerial/policy implications, but there are also
some limitations, thus launching further research. First, this paper examines the relationship between
corporate strategy and cost stickiness under different managerial expectations in the companies in
China. However, it does not test our hypothesis in the contexts and samples of other countries, such
as other developed and emerging economies. For example, traditionally, companies from American
and Western European countries have evolved with the different corporate strategies and cost
stickiness under different managerial expectations from companies in China as well as in other
emerging markets, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. Even, in the representative
emerging markets, China and India have very different corporate histories and corporate
governances [67,68] that might have affected these factors. Hence, comparative studies among these
dissimilar countries are needed to compare our findings with others.
Second, our sample firms are all listed companies. However, even in China, there are many nonlisted firms, particularly small and medium-sized private firms that have metamorphosed as the
creative innovators in both domestic and global markets [69,70]. Hence, the comparative study
between listed and non-listed companies, particularly small and medium-sized non-listed
enterprises, is necessary as future research.
Third, although there are differences between industry sectors, this study does not investigate
our hypotheses in the comparison between industry sectors. For example, the energy, transportation,
and waste sectors [71] can have different connotations from the manufacturing sector using digital
platforms [72]; thus, they can have quite heterogeneous industry effects in our sample. Hence, as
future research, we need to cover the agenda of the different industrial sectors.
Fourth, since large emerging markets, such as China, are rapidly internationalizing markets
where domestic and foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) operate based on both inward and
outward foreign direct investments (FDIs) [73,74], the internationalizing companies’ strategic choices
are crucial due to how it affects cost structure and cost stickiness. However, this study does not catch
the essence of these MNEs’ strategic choices and their influences on cost structure and cost stickiness
well. Hence, future research needs to cover this important issue.
Finally, due to our data accessibility limitedness, we could not include more control variables
dealing with some issues such as corporate governance, political stability, regulations, and economic
issues. Nevertheless, this paper splits the full sample into the subsamples of state-owned and nonstate-owned firms, so in this way, we cover corporate governance of listed companies in China. Also,
we control for the annual GDP growth rate, so we cover at least one economic issue. However, during
our sample period, at least in China, political stability and regulations have not significantly changed
[75,76], and further, our sample country is only one so that this paper could not include these control
variables that covers political stability and regulations. Yet, as future studies, with the larger sample
of various countries, we may add these more control variables.
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